从矿区政府到地方政府:中国油田地区条块关系的形成与演变

条块关系是由“条”与“块”分别承担的任务之冲突程度决定的,条块关系的演变也是由任务之间的冲突变化所导致的。如果中央政府需要下属政府机构同时完成多项任务,那么,多项任务之间的冲突将导致条与块的形成,而且,其冲突的严重程度决定了条块关系的特征,即决定了条块结合程度的高低。进而言之,任务之间的冲突程度上升将推动条块结合程度下降;反之,将导致条块结合程度上升。这一观点来源于多任务委托—代理理论,在本研究中得到了油田地区条块关系的支持,即可以解释在六个设市的油田地区条块关系的形成与演变。

From Minefield Authority to Local Government: Formation and Evolution of Tiao-Kuai Relation in China's Oil Field Regions

A significant character of the Chinese state governance is the structure of tiao (vertical lines of authority from top down) and kuai (horizontal levels of authority of the territorial government) and the constant adjustment of the relationship between the two. Varies studies on state governance in China either neglect this character or frame the discussion in the way of central vs local authority. This brings us to an unanswered question of how to explain the formation and evolution of tiao-kuai relationship. This paper argues that the conflicts between the tasks undertaken by tiao and kuai are largely responsible for shaping the relationship. Often the central government assigns subordinate authorities multiple tasks that conflict with one another,a factor that dictates the degree of integration between tiao and kuai. The data collected from six oil field citiessupport the argument that the less compatible of the tasks between the two,the more clashes occur. Our study confirms the multi-task principal-agent theory. The tiao-kuai structure is an attempt by the central government to resolve the paradox between centralized authority and effective local governance while trying to achieve multiple development targets. It is hoped that this study will stimulate further theoretical discussion of the inherent contradiction of a centralized government and a better understanding of the institutional arrangement of the tiao-kuai structure.