现象溢出与认知取用

现象溢出是近来意识研究的一个争论热点。现象溢出命题的支持者认为,斯伯林类型的实验充分表明,现象意识的丰富内容溢出了取用意识的有限容量。反对者则认为,现象溢出命题不仅没有证据支持,而且还有严重的方法论问题。我将表明,斯伯林类型的实验并不能像反对者所认为的那样用类错觉或碎片错觉来解释。由于现象溢出命题所涉及的认知取用要比心理功能严格得多,所以不会导致溢出的现象意识无法加以经验研究的问题。更一般地,由于我们可以将现象意识在场或不在场的直接或间接证据以及包括NCC在内其他更多证据结合起来进行最佳解释推理,所以,现象溢出命题不存在方法论上的问题。我的结论是,就已有证据而言,现象溢出命题是符合最佳解释推理的合理主张。

Phenomenal Overflow and Cognitive Access

One of the most debated highlights in recent consciousness studies is the phenomenal overflow controversy.The proponents of the phenomenal overflow thesis maintain that the Sperling-style experiments have shown that the rich content of phenomenal consciousnessoverflowsthe limited capacity of access consciousness.On the contrary,the opponents argue that the phenomenal overflow thesis is not only not well supported by empirical evidence,but also has a severe methodological problem.In this paper,it will be showed that the results of the Sperling-style experiments cannot get explained bygeneric illusionorfragment illusionas the opponents think.Theoverflowedphenomenal consciousness will not defy empirical studies,because the cognitive access involved in phenomenal overflow is far more limited than psychological function.More generally,because the direct and indirect evidence for the presence or absence of phenomenal consciousness and other evidence including NCC that can be combined to make inference of the best explanation,therefore,there is no methodological problem with the phenomenal overflow thesis.It is concluded that,as far as the existing evidence is concerned,the phenomenal overflow thesis is a plausible claim conforming to the inference of the best explanation.