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大型零售店“进场费”与“优势地位滥用”规制
引用本文:吴小丁.大型零售店“进场费”与“优势地位滥用”规制[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,2004(5).
作者姓名:吴小丁
作者单位:吉林大学商学院 吉林长春130012
摘    要:“进场费”问题是交易中“优势地位滥用”的一个典型事例,是买方垄断势力破坏竞 争秩序而导致的市场失灵,因而是竞争政策规制的对象。买方垄断所造成的低效率,对消费者转嫁 的费用负担,至少是双层或者双层以上的。企业在交易中优势地位的形成,是由“供求关系倾斜” 导致的。对交易中“优势地位滥用”的规制,在日本、德国、法国的竞争法中都有规定。我国竞争 政策及其立法明显滞后,公共政策的介入如果没有严格的法律约束,便很容易导致政府的失灵。

关 键 词:进场费  优势地位滥用  买方垄断  竞争政策

"Entrance Fee" of Large Retail Stores and Regulations against "Dominant Position Abuse"
WU Xiao,ding."Entrance Fee" of Large Retail Stores and Regulations against "Dominant Position Abuse"[J].Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition,2004(5).
Authors:WU Xiao  ding
Abstract:Entrance fee is a typical problem resulting from dominant position abuse. It is market disfunction that occurs when monopolistic buyer breaks up competition order. So competition policy should regulate the fee. Low efficiency brought about by buyer monopoly, and relevant costs transferred to consumer are at least double or more. The enterprise's dominant position is due to imbalanced relation between supply and demand. Japan, Germany and France have made regulations against dominant position abuse, while China's competition policy and legislation are obviously backward. The introduction of public policy without strict legal restriction is likely to cause government disfunction.
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