Delegation and motivation |
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Authors: | Lukas Angst Karol Jan Borowiecki |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland 2. Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
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Abstract: | We investigate the determinants of decision rights transfer and its effects on the motivation of an agent. The study is based on a laboratory experiment conducted on 130 subjects playing an innovative principal–agent game. Interestingly, the results show that agents do not favour a delegation and a decision is considered rather burdensome. Although the experiment could not give support for the behavioural hypothesis of higher effort provided by participants who receive choice subsequently, the survey illuminates the interaction between delegation motives, effort motivators, goals and other perceptions of the agents. |
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