政府声誉介入下的上市公司虚假信息披露博弈分析

基于KMRW声誉模型 ,从“政府-上市公司-投资者”三方博弈的视角对上市公司虚假信息披露行为进行博弈分析可以发现 ,在政府声誉介入条件下 ,投资者与上市公司的两方博弈实质上为三方博弈 ,投资者对上市公司能力的先验概率取决于上市公司与博弈第三方--政府的博弈结果。由于政府对发行上市和增资配股的行政管制具有事前性 ,上市公司预期收入是信息披露的函数 ,因此金融监管规定决定了均衡业绩披露。当对上市公司有利的均衡业绩偏离真实业绩时 ,上市公司倾向于利用建立在政府声誉基础上的伪声誉进行以“盈余操纵”、“微利现象”为特征的虚假信息披露。据此 ,金融监管机构应在加强市场微观基础建设的条件下 ,逐步实现“买者自负”的市场化监管。

A Game Analysis of Fraudulent Reporting of Listed Companies When Government Reputation Interferes

This paper builds a government reputation-interfered game model based on the KMRW reputation model framework . The behavior of fraudulent reporting is analyzed from a three-participant game perspective including government , listed companies and investors . This paper shows that the game between investors and listed companies essentially becomes a three-participant game in which the probability that investors will invest in a listed company is dependent on the outcome of the game between government and listed companies . As the government's regulation policies are issued in advance , the expected income of listed companies is a function of disclosure , so the regulation policy decides the disclosure of balanced performance . When the listed companies disclose a favorable balance , deviating from the true performance , they tend to use the false reputation gained from the government's reputation to disclose false information characterized by″earnings manipulation″and″low-profit phenomenon″. According to these findings , we suggest that regulators should realize the″caveat emptor″market-oriented regulation on the basis of a solid market micro-infrastructure .