| Abstract: | Monitoring, as an important function for boards of directors in both the private and nonprofit sectors, receives widespread attention throughout the empirical (Chait, Holland, and Taylor, 1996; Eisenhardt, 1989; Golden‐Biddle and Rao, 1997; Kosnik, 1987) and normative literature (Axelrod, 1994; Block, 1998; Carver, 1997; Houle, 1997; Ingram, 1989). Despite the consensus about the significance of this crucial board responsibility, scholars know little about the ways in which a nonprofit board actually performs its monitoring function. In this article I report on an empirical study of the monitoring behavior of twelve nonprofit boards of directors. Agency theory provides the framework for this analysis. I show that the way in which individual board members define their relationship with the chief executive and understand the scope of the monitoring function influences how, or if, they monitor agency action. The findings also show that, given ambiguous rules of accountability and unclear measures of performance, nonprofit board members tend to monitor in ways that reflect their professional or personal competencies rather than paying attention to measures that would indicate progress toward mission‐related goals and initiatives. |
