| 基于一类两级供应链的激励机制策略研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 黄祖庆,达庆利. 基于一类两级供应链的激励机制策略研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2005, 19(3): 28-31 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 黄祖庆 达庆利 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 东南大学经济管理学院,江苏,南京,210096;景德镇陶瓷学院,江西,景德镇,333001
2. 东南大学经济管理学院,江苏,南京,210096 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社科基金"十五"规划项目(01JA630048) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文利用博弈论和信息经济学理论和方法,深入研究了一类两级供应链在产品价格固定、需求是随机的情况下激励机制的设立,以及该激励机制对供应商和零售商收益产生的影响。研究结果表明,本文设计的激励机制对提高供应链整体运作效益的有效性,并用实际算例加以验证。
|
| 关 键 词： | 供应链管理 激励 期望收益 纳什均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-6062(2005)03-0028-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003-10-15 |
Research on Incentive Mechanism Strategy:Base on a Class of Two Echelon Supply Chain |
| |
| HUANG Zu-qing,DA Qing-li. Research on Incentive Mechanism Strategy:Base on a Class of Two Echelon Supply Chain[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2005, 19(3): 28-31 |
| |
| Authors: | HUANG Zu-qing DA Qing-li |
| |
| Affiliation: | HUANG Zu-qing~1,2,DA Qing-li~2 |
| |
| Abstract: | Using the Game Theory and the Information Economics,this article has made a further research on the impact on the economic returns of the suppliers and retailers caused by the incentive mechanism under the circumstance of fixed prices and random demand.Results indicated that the validity for this incentive mechanism to improve the overall opetational benefit in a supply chain was proved.In the final place,a numerical example has been given to verify the relevant conclusion. |
| |
| Keywords: | supply chain management incentive expected returns Nash equilibrium |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
