| Abstract: | Objectives. Our aim is to test the influence of business interest groups on Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) policy at the state level. Methods. We use the state TANF guarantee, the length of time recipients have before they lose their benefits, and the existence of a “family cap” as dependent variables in three models. Each of the models tests business interest group power and several other measures that represent possible influences on the dependent variable. Results. We find that business interest group power is significantly related to both the generosity of the TANF guarantee and to TANF time limits. However, it is not related to the presence of the family cap in state TANF policy. Conclusions. The evidence we found is consistent with the idea that those state TANF policies that are most intimately related to business interests are just those policies that are most affected by business group influence. States' TANF policies regarding maximum benefit and time limits both have a direct impact on wealth redistribution and labor‐market behavior. On the other hand, business interest groups do not seem to have much influence on the presence of TANF family caps, policies that are arguably less the concern of business interest groups, and more connected to public attitudes toward families and children. |
