首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Games without Rules
Authors:Flavio Menezes  John Quiggin
Affiliation:(1) School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia;(2) School of Economics, University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
Abstract:We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.
Keywords:Outcome spaces  folk theorem
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号