首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

股权制衡、终极所有权性质与上市企业非效率投资
引用本文:安灵,刘星,白艺昕.股权制衡、终极所有权性质与上市企业非效率投资[J].管理工程学报,2008,22(2):122-129.
作者姓名:安灵  刘星  白艺昕
作者单位:1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030
2. 西南大学数学与统计学院,重庆,400715
摘    要:本文采用基于海洋博弈的shapley指数,对我国上市公司第一大股东的实际控制度与股权制衡度进行了测度,在此基础上.运用门槛面板模型研究了股权制衡度、终极所有权性质与上市公司非效率投资行为的关系.结果表明:第一大股东对上市公司的实际控制度与上市公司的非效率投资行为表现为一种非线性关系;股权制衡能够抑制大股东利益主导下的过度投资行为,但过度的股权制衡会带来投资不足的问题;不同终极所有权性质对上市公司资源配置行为和股权制衡效果影响显著:相对于中央直属上市公司,地方政府控制的上市公司表现出强烈的过度投资倾向,且利益趋同效应在地方政府所属上市公司比较微弱,而中央直属和省级政府所属上市公司的股权制衡效果相对较差.

关 键 词:股权结构  非效率投资  海洋博弈  门槛面板模型
文章编号:1004-6062(2008)02-0122-08
修稿时间:2006年12月13

Check-and-Balance of Stock Ownership,Ultimate Ownerships and Inefficient Investment in Listed Firms in China
AN Ling,LIU Xing,BAI Yi-xin.Check-and-Balance of Stock Ownership,Ultimate Ownerships and Inefficient Investment in Listed Firms in China[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2008,22(2):122-129.
Authors:AN Ling  LIU Xing  BAI Yi-xin
Institution:AN Ling~1,LIU Xing~1,BAI Yi-xin~2(1.College of Economics , Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China,2.College of Mathematics , Statistics,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715,China)
Abstract:This paper investigates the control degree of the largest shareholders and check-and-balance of stock ownership in listed firms of China by oceanic games model,further,studying the relationship of check-and-balance of stock ownership,ultimately ownerships and inefficient investment based on threshold panel model.It is found that there is a nonlinear relationship between the control degree of the largest shareholders;check-and-balance of stock ownership would mitigate the overinvestment dominated by the larg...
Keywords:ownership structure  inefficient investment  oceanic games  threshold panel model  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号