Stability and Efficiency of Partitions in Matching Problems |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">?pek??zkal-SanverEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, İstanbul Bilgi University, Kuştepe, 80310 İstanbul, Turkey |
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Abstract: | We define two versions of stability and efficiency of partitions and analyze their relationships for some matching rules. The stability and efficiency of a partition depends on the matching rule φ. The results are stated under various membership property rights axioms. It is shown that in a world where agents can freely exit from and enter coalitions, whenever the matching rule is individually rational and Pareto optimal, the set of φ-stable and φ-efficient partitions coincide and it is unique: the grand coalition. Then we define a weaker version of stability and efficiency, namely specific to a given preference profile and find some negative results for stable matching rules. |
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Keywords: | matching partitions membership property rights stability efficiency |
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