The common will

This paper discusses the formation of a common will among a group of people from two separate points of view: that of social choice theory and that of discourse ethics. The paper evaluates the formation of a common will by “silent” mechanisms for aggregating individual wishes and preferences, traditionally the domain of social choice theory, from a procedural perspective. I will consider—and answer in the negative—the question of whether or not there exists a mechanism for aggregating individual preferences that is perfectly reflective—in the sense that it can be applied recursively in order to justify or legitimate its own application. I will then consider discourse ethics from a consequentialist standpoint—rather than the traditional, process-oriented perspective from which it usually advanced and defended—and show that its insistence on dialogue as a means for the formation of a common will is based on underlying assumptions about the nature of preferences—such as the discussability of tastes and the malleability of time scales—which run counter to the view of preferences normally associated with standard economic theory. I conclude that, although neither approach to the formation of a common will fares well by the standards normally used to justify the other, proponents of either approach have much to learn from a dialogue with proponents of the other.