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论政府雇员的自利性及其控制
引用本文:沈承诚. 论政府雇员的自利性及其控制[J]. 云南社会科学, 2006, 1(2): 11-15
作者姓名:沈承诚
作者单位:南京师范大学,公共管理学院,江苏,南京,210097
摘    要:政府雇员制本质上就是掌握专业知识的单纯“经济人”为追求自身利益而对公共领域的一种介入。问题的关键根本不在所谓政府雇员“公共人”与“经济人”双重角色的失衡,而在于如何使得这种介入达到政府与雇员之间的利益共赢,而要达到这种共赢的局面,就必须对政府雇员的自利性进行控制。

关 键 词:政府雇员  自利性  经济人  信息不对称
文章编号:1000-8691(2006)02-0011-05
修稿时间:2006-01-05

On Governmental Employees' Self-interested Nature and Its Controlling Countermeasures
SHEN Cheng-chen. On Governmental Employees' Self-interested Nature and Its Controlling Countermeasures[J]. Social Sciences in Yunnan, 2006, 1(2): 11-15
Authors:SHEN Cheng-chen
Abstract:This article, through the role position and analysis of government employees, concludes they possess dual natures of "public person" and " economic man", so they will pursue both pubic interest and self-interest. Enormous possibility of role unbalance exists under the present system, this article makes detailed discussion on the causes of the unbalance, and analyzes the unbalanced characteristics of "self-interest" nature, finally puts forward some controlling countermeasures.
Keywords:Governmental employees,Characteristics of "  self-interested"   nature,Economic man,Information unbalance,
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