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农户联保贷款制度的博弈机制及其实践分析
引用本文:罗琦. 农户联保贷款制度的博弈机制及其实践分析[J]. 江西农业大学学报(社会科学版), 2013, 0(4): 461-464
作者姓名:罗琦
作者单位:华南农业大学经济管理学院,广东广州510642
摘    要:农户联保贷款制度是为缺乏抵押和担保能力的农民群体服务的一种金融创新方式。联保贷款制度在实际运行当中效果并不理想,运用博弈论分析影响农户还款积极性的关键因素,发现由于联保小组组建困难,联保条件过于苛刻,手续过于繁杂以及机会主义与道德风险造成了农户联保贷款制度不能有效推行,并提出了相应的对策建议。

关 键 词:农村金融  农户联保贷款  还款博弈

Game Theory Analysis of Rural Micro-credit System
LUO Qi. Game Theory Analysis of Rural Micro-credit System[J]. Journal of Jianxi Agricultural University(Social Science Edition), 2013, 0(4): 461-464
Authors:LUO Qi
Affiliation:LUO Qi ( College of Economics and Management, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou 510642, China)
Abstract:Rural micro-credit system is a kind of financial innovation to serve for the farmers who lack of collateral and guarantees.In this paper the key elements that influence repayment are analyzed by game theory. Owing to the difficulty of set up the security group, warranty conditions, complicated formalities and opportun- ism behavior tendency, the rural micro-credit system unable to effectively implement.Finally, recommendations for the development of rural micro-credit system are proposed.
Keywords:rural finance  rural micro-credit system  game of repayment
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