首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency
Authors:Grant  Simon  Kajii  Atsushi  Polak  Ben
Institution:(1) Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia;(2) Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia;(3) Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
Abstract:We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent.
Keywords:Information  Non-expected utility  Dynamic consistency  Randomization  Anxiety
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号