| 基于诚信因素的银企信贷合约进化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 强爽,何明升.基于诚信因素的银企信贷合约进化博弈分析[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版),2011,13(2):97-102. |
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| 作者姓名： | 强爽 何明升 |
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| 作者单位： | 哈尔滨工业大学,经济与管理学院,哈尔滨,150001 |
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| 摘 要： | 应用信任理论,以诚信因素作为内生变量构建银企信贷风险决策模型,对银企信贷合约进行了进化博弈分析,推导出维持信贷合作的最低信用度底线及合作周期,证明了在投资环境不确定性增加合约实现难度的条件下,利用诚信因素调整银企之间的合作机制,使信贷合约实现双赢的局面。
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| 关 键 词： | 诚信 信任 信贷合约 蜈蚣博弈 进化博弈 |
Evolution Game Analysis in Banks and Enterprises Credit Contract Based on Good Faith Factor |
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| QIANG Shuang,HE Ming-sheng.Evolution Game Analysis in Banks and Enterprises Credit Contract Based on Good Faith Factor[J].Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2011,13(2):97-102. |
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| Authors: | QIANG Shuang HE Ming-sheng |
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| Institution: | (School of Economics and Management,Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001,China) |
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| Abstract: | This paper applies the trust theory,establishes banks and enterprises credit risk decision model by taking the good faith factor as the endogenous variable,carries on the evolution game analysis of the banks-enterprises credit contract and infers maintenance credit cooperation lowest credit agent and the cooperation cycle.This paper also proves that in the investment environment uncertainty which increases the difficulty of realizing the contract by using good faith factor to adjust banks and enterprises’ cooperation mechanism,the credit contract can be made to realize the win-win aspect. |
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| Keywords: | good faith trust credit contract centipede game evolution game |
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