Intentions and ethical behavior in trust games |
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Authors: | Pierre Lacour |
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Institution: | Clinical Assistant Professor of Economics, New York University, School of Continuing and Professional Studies, Paul McGhee Division, 7 East 12th Street, Room 663D, New York, NY 10003, United States |
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Abstract: | This paper explores if knowledge of one's partner's intention affects cooperative behavior. Results of a trust game experiment show that Player 1's elicited intentions are consistent over an imperfect information treatment, when Player 2 is not aware of her partner's intention, and a perfect information treatment, when she knows it. Evidence highlights that people's intentions on one side of the games shape their beliefs as to how their partner wants them to act when the roles are reversed. Moreover, in the perfect information treatment, participants act in a manner consistent with their own intentions, suggesting that ethical considerations permeate behavior. |
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Keywords: | C72 C78 C91 |
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