| 运输企业的合作风险研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 马军,刘军,杨肇夏. 运输企业的合作风险研究[J]. 北京交通大学学报(社会科学版), 2005, 4(3): 14-17,43 |
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| 作者姓名： | 马军 刘军 杨肇夏 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京交通大学,交通运输学院,北京,100044;北京交通大学,交通运输学院,北京,100044;北京交通大学,交通运输学院,北京,100044 |
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| 基金项目： | 铁道部软科学计划研究项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 在运输企业面临的各种风险当中,合作风险是指运输企业与业务相关的企业及政府部门打交道时所面临的风险.利用委托-代理理论对这种风险进行分析研究,可以得出在信息对称与否以及双方风险态度不同时,运输企业与这些合作企业(或部门)所承担的风险是不同的,运输企业可通过对这些合作企业(或部门)加强监督及调控剩余利润的索取权来合理有效地分配风险.该研究既是对博弈论的委托-代理理论的实证应用,又是对运输理论的发展和补充.
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| 关 键 词： | 运输企业 合作伙伴 风险分担 委托代理 最优报酬 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-8106(2005)03-0014-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-12-24 |
Research on Cooperative Risk of Transportation Industry |
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| MA Jun,LIU Jun,YANG Zhao-xia. Research on Cooperative Risk of Transportation Industry[J]. Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University Social Sciences Edition, 2005, 4(3): 14-17,43 |
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| Authors: | MA Jun LIU Jun YANG Zhao-xia |
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| Abstract: | By using the principal_agent theory, cooperative risks are analyzed between transportation industry and its partners,such as enterprises and government departments.It is then concluded that their risks are different whether the information between transportation industry and its partners are symmetry,or whether their attitudes toward risks are different,and that risks can be reasonably shared by reinforcing supervision to partners and arranging residual profit.The research is not only an empirical application for the theory of principal_agent but also the development for transportation theory. |
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| Keywords: | transportation industry cooperative partner risk-sharing principal-agent optimal payment |
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