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| 企业的冗余程度与基于冗余的技术创新激励合约 | |
| 引用本文： | 钟和平,张旭梅,方润生.企业的冗余程度与基于冗余的技术创新激励合约[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(1):41-46. |
| 作者姓名： | 钟和平 张旭梅 方润生 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044;中原工学院经济管理学院,河南郑州,450007 2. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044 3. 中原工学院经济管理学院,河南郑州,450007 |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，河南省教育厅自然科学研究项目 |
| 摘 要： | 基于多任务委托代理模型的分析框架,建立了企业员工基于冗余的技术创新活动的信息不对称条件下的委托代理模型,通过对模型的分析,得出了当企业冗余不足时、适度时和过多时等不同情况下的基于冗余的技术创新活动的最优激励合同的条件,同时.还提出了效率风险概念,从理论上解释了企业普遍存在的一种现象:做出重大贡献者往往并不能分享相应的份额. |
| 关 键 词： | 冗余 冗余程度 技术创新 激励 委托代理 效率风险 |
Levels of Organizational Slack and Incentive Contracts of Technological Innovation Based on Organizational Slack |
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| ZHONG He-ping,ZHANG Xu-mei,FANG Run-sheng.Levels of Organizational Slack and Incentive Contracts of Technological Innovation Based on Organizational Slack[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2009,23(1):41-46. | |
| Authors: | ZHONG He-ping ZHANG Xu-mei FANG Run-sheng |
| Institution: | 1;2;1.School of Economics & Business Administration;Chongqing University;Chongqing 400044;China;2.School of Economics & Management;Zhongyuan University of Technology;Zhengzhou 450007;China |
| Abstract: | Based on the analysis frames of the multi-task principal-agent model,this paper formulates a model of principal-agent on the condition of asymmetrical information while employers are engaged in the technological innovation based on organizational slack.Through analysis of the model,this paper obtains the best incentive contracts of the technological innovation based on low,moderate,high levels of organizational slack.In addition,this paper introduces the concept of efficiency risk,which explains theoretical... |
| Keywords: | organizational slack levels of organizational slack innovation incentive principal-agent efficiency risk |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |