Making statements and approval voting |
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Authors: | Enriqueta Aragones Itzhak Gilboa Andrew Weiss |
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Institution: | 1. Institut d??An??lisi Econ??mica, C.S.I.C., Barcelona, Spain 2. Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 3. Department of Economics and Decision Sciences HEC, Paris, France 4. Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
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Abstract: | We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule. |
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