| 公司选举中累积投票制的经济法分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 史琪.公司选举中累积投票制的经济法分析[J].盐城工学院学报(社会科学版),2020,33(3):42-45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 史琪 |
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| 作者单位： | 扬州大学 法学院, 江苏 扬州 225000 |
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| 摘 要： | 从经济法学角度分析了从美国引进的累积投票制，在我国实际应用中存在不能保护小股东的利益、效益甚微的现象。结合目前我国的经济发展和公司法中的效率理论，应该合理运用小股东权利益受损后的事后救济、市场自发调节等机制，才能最大程度维护股东和公司利益。
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| 关 键 词： | 法经济学 累积投票制 股东投票权 剩余索取权 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020/5/8 0:00:00 |
Legal and Economic Analysis of Cumulative Voting System in Company Election |
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| SHI Qi.Legal and Economic Analysis of Cumulative Voting System in Company Election[J].Journal of Yancheng Institute of Technology,2020,33(3):42-45. |
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| Authors: | SHI Qi |
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| Institution: | Law School, Yangzhou University, Yangzhou Jiangsu225000, China |
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| Abstract: | From the perspective of law and economics, this paper analyzes the phenomenon that the cumulative voting system introduced from the United States can not protect the interests of minority shareholders in the practical application in China. Combined with the current economic development and the efficiency theory in the company law, the author thinks that we should reasonably use the mechanism of post relief and market spontaneous adjustment after the rights of small shareholders are damaged, so as to protect the interests of shareholders and companies to the greatest extent. |
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| Keywords: | law and economics cumulative voting voting rights of shareholders residual claim |
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