| Abstract: | This paper makes a theoretical innovation by integrating two key principles – mutual forbearance and the principle of congruity – into one general process model. It examines the micro‐mechanisms underlying the formation of a mutual‐forbearance agreement and explicates the role of time and of individual actions. We further understanding of the process of cooperation building by drawing a parallel between early stages of the formation process of mutual forbearance and cooperation, and argue that mutual forbearance may, under certain conditions, lead to long‐term cooperation or, if mismanaged, completely smother any chances of it. A prospective agreement may be put at risk when potential contributions are evaluated differently by each party and no action to mitigate the consequences is taken; even more so in a mutual‐forbearance context when the parties can only observe their counterparts’ actions through the market. Our model takes into account the micro‐mechanisms associated with the time between the actions of one entity/individual (e.g. the top manager) and the reaction of another entity/individual, the boundary conditions of the background to those actions and the alternative actions available during this time. Propositions for further exploration and implications are drawn. |
