政府与食品生产企业的合谋监管博弈

基于前景理论，考虑中央政府、地方政府和食品生产者的心理特征，构建三方受益感知矩阵，并进行合谋监管的博弈分析，得出了合谋监管的均衡条件。研究表明，地方政府和食品生产者的心理因素是影响合谋策略的重要因素。因此，中央政府要紧紧围绕改变合谋双方的主观感知来防范合谋，通过制度设计，实施差异监管，加强信息曝光，完善声誉机制，形成心理威慑效应，改变地方政府和食品生产者对合谋的成本收益的主观感知，以抑制合谋行为。

Regulation Game of Collusion between Government and Food Production Enterprises

Based on the prospect theory, considering the psychological characteristics of central government, local governments and food production enterprises, we built a perception matrix of the three-party revenue and conducted a game analysis of collusion regulation, the equilibrium conditions for collusion regulation are obtained. Research shows that the psychological factors of local governments and food production enterprises are important factors influencing collusion strategies. Therefore, the central government should guard against collusion closely by changing the subjective perception on both sides. On this basis, through the system design, implement differential supervision, strengthen information exposure, improve the reputation mechanism, and change the subjective perception of local governments and food production enterprises on the cost-benefit of collusion to form a psychological deterrent effect to curb collusion.