| Abstract: | Abstract. Moving off from the lessons of the Italian incomes policy experience of the 1980s, this paper presents a new framework to interpret the performance of incomes policy (LP) agreements and institutions, and propose new strategies for the 1990s. IP is viewed as a cooperative outcome that evolves from a non-cooperative long-term game between several players (workers, unions, firms, government, parliament, etc.), along the lines of the model drawn up by Brunetta and Carraro (1988). The paper is divided into three sections. The first summarizes the history of IP in Italy, starting from the phase of the predetermination of disinflation (1983-84). We firstly outline some of the fundamental features of recent Italian development (the “Italian model”), noting how new IP measures could be taken to create an adequate response to the new European and international deadlines. The difficulties and uncertainties that presently exist at both national and international level make the introduction of IP in new, cooperative and evolutive terms, necessary. The second section examines the various topics and new objectives of a “strategic” IP resumption, particularly relevant to the concerted action on the cost of labour, presently being discussed. The topics we consider are: the link between wage reform and IP; the recent concerted agreements reached on fiscal drag (26.1.89) and on the cost of labour (25.1 and 6.7.90); the importance of the role of productivity gain-sharing; programmed inflation and price control; indexation of gross wages and safeguarding the net wage; increase of the tax base; profit-sharing. The third and final section presents a few observations which further investigate the distribution of productivity gains between sectors and uses: how it is articulated amongst the various bargaining levels (central, sectoral or enterprise). Redistribution amongst sectors is dealt with in terms of “protected” and “unprotected” areas of the economy, showing the need of a concerted regulation at the central level. Sharing between factors and allocations presents a very different case, and is dealt with at sectoral and firm level. |
