| 股票期权激励的博弈探讨 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱程峰,林凤.股票期权激励的博弈探讨[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2003,5(6):53-55. |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱程峰 林凤 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.上海理工大学,上海,200093 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文由委托—代理引出股票期权激励,对股票期权从经理人员和公司(股东)两个角度进行博弈分析,明确了股票期权激励的必要性和其特殊优势作用,同时指出了股票期权有效运行的外部条件。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈 股票期权 激励 经理人 股东 外部条件 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-3370(2003)06-0053-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2003/6/27 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年6月27日 |
Analyzing motivation of stock options through game theory |
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| ZHU Cheng-feng and LIN Feng.Analyzing motivation of stock options through game theory[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2003,5(6):53-55. |
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| Authors: | ZHU Cheng-feng and LIN Feng |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai,200093 |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,we put forward the problem of principal-agent and resolve it by the motivation of stock options.In the following,we analyze the motivation of stock options from the two sides of managers and shareholders and indicate the necessity and especial function of it.Additionally,the external conditions needed for its efficient operation is indicated. |
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| Keywords: | Play game Stock options Motivate Manager Shareholder External conditions |
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