| 成渝客运市场博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 龙志和,辛亚萍.成渝客运市场博弈分析[J].电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),1999(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 龙志和 辛亚萍 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南交通大学经济管理学院!成都６１００３１ |
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| 基金项目： | 国家杰出青年科学基金!79725002 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用博弈模型对成渝容运市场竞争状况进行了实证分析。采用斯塔伯格竞争模型研究结论认为，在高速公路进入前，成渝客运市场已达到纳什均衡。价格博弈模型表明，铁路与高速公路竞争中，避免价格战是双方最优主导战略。旅客间的ＰＵＶ博弈结果证明，成渝客运市场中旅客在不同运输方式中的分布是对其总效用博弈的结果。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈模型 旅客运输 运输市场 竞争 |
Analysis of Game of Chengdu-Chongqing Passengers' Transportation Market |
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| Long Zhihe, Xing Yaping.Analysis of Game of Chengdu-Chongqing Passengers' Transportation Market[J].Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition),1999(6). |
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| Authors: | Long Zhihe Xing Yaping |
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| Abstract: | Positive analysis of competitions on the Chengdu-Chongqing passengers' market isconducted using game model. The research with Stacketbers model shows that the Chengdu-Chongqingpassengers' transportation market reaches Nash equilibrium before the express highway enters it. Pricegame model indicates that avoidance of fierce competition by price deduction is the best strategy for bothparties. Results of PUV games betWeen passengers reveal that passengers distribution in different means oftransportation is the outcome of the game on their overall effects. |
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| Keywords: | game model passenger transportation transportation market competition |
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