信息透明度与经理薪酬契约有效性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据

本文以2003-2006年深圳证券交易所A股上市公司为研究对象,实证考察信息透明度对经理薪酬契约有效性的影响,试图从经理薪酬契约角度重新诠释信息透明度的经济后果.研究发现,信息透明度能够显著提高经理薪酬契约的有效性.具体而言,信息透明度越高的公司,经理薪酬业绩敏感性越高,经理薪酬与盈利业绩和亏损业绩之间的非对称性越小.研究还发现,与非国有企业相比,国有上市公司信息透明度对经理薪酬契约有效性的影响更加显著.本研究论证了信息透明度在减少股东与经理之间的信息不对称和降低公司代理成本中的重要作用.

Information Transparency and Executive Compensation Contract: Evidence from Chinese Security Market

Information and incentive problems impede the efficient allocation of resources in a capital market economy. Transparent disclosure plays an important role in mitigating these problems. Using Chinese listed companies in Shenzhen security market from 2003 to 2006 as research samples, this paper analyzes the effect of information transparency on executive compensation contract. As an important corporate governance mechanism executive compensation contract can restrict the moral hazards of top management by connecting compensation with performance. So the effectiveness of executive compensation contract can be measured by compensation-performance sensitivity. The higher is the sensitivity of compensation to performance, the more efficiency is the compensation contract. We suppose that information transparency can significantly promote the efficiency of compensation contract by facilitating the observation of manager's efforts and affecting the usefulness of accounting information in compensation contract. The empirical results verify the above assumption and show that information transparency has significant positive effect on compensation-performance sensitivity. The compensation-performance sensitivity is higher in the company with higher transparency. An even more important finding is that the sensitivity of compensation to earnings is higher than the sensitivity of compensation to losses, but information transparency can significantly decrease the asymmetric sensitivity of compensation between earnings and losses, which means the information transparency promotes both the incentive to a diligent manager and the punishment on an incompetent manager. Further we exam the effect of information transparency on compensation contract under different property rights and find that the promotion of transparency on compensation -performance sensitivity is more significant in state-owned enterprises. This paper demonstrates the important role of information transparency in decreasing agency cost between the shareholders and management. Also it develops the information transparency research by explaining anew the economic consequence of information transparency from the angle of executive compensation contract.