Subjective expected utility theory revisited: A reductio ad absurdum paradox |
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Authors: | Paul J. H. Schoemaker |
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Affiliation: | (1) Graduate School of Business University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, 60637 Chicago, IL, USA |
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Abstract: | A paradox is posed and analyzed in which people reverse their preferences for information on probabilities versus prizes once the range of the unknown probabilities is sufficiently narrowed. This reversal is shown to be incompatible with both objective expected utility (EU) as well as subjective versions in which the same probability transformation applies to all random variables. Experimental data are presented showing that the reversals occur with small, medium and large payoffs.The present paradox is compared with those of Allais and Ellsberg, and found to differ in substantive ways. It raises further questions about the normative status of expected utility theory, especially its treatment of probability and value. The paradox specifically calls into question EU's substitution and compound probability axioms. |
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Keywords: | Expected utility probability distortion Allais and Ellsberg paradox generalized utility |
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