Family firms and high technology Mergers & Acquisitions |
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Authors: | Paul André Walid Ben-Amar Samir Saadi |
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Affiliation: | 1. ESSEC Business School, Av. Bernard Hirsch, B.P. 50105, 95021, Cergy, France 2. Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa, 55 Laurier East, Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5, Canada 3. Queen’s School of Business, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, K7L 3N6, Canada
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Abstract: | We examine whether family firms undertake value creating high technology M&A. We also examine whether level of ownership, diversification, agency issues and CEO type matter. Our sample consists of high-technology M&A undertaken by Canadian firms over the period 1997–2006. Canada offers a setting with many family firms and the use of control enhancing mechanisms such as dual class shares and pyramid structures. We find a positive relationship between family ownership and announcement period abnormal returns. This relationship, however, starts to decrease at higher levels of ownership but remains overall positive. We also show that the agency conflict between shareholders and professional managers has a detrimental impact on announcement period abnormal returns whereas the conflict between controlling and minority shareholders via control enhancing mechanisms does not. Finally, we document that founder CEO undertake better high tech M&A than descendant or hired CEO. |
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