| 契约的可实施性与中国企业组织形式选择 |
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| 引用本文： | 郑宏星. 契约的可实施性与中国企业组织形式选择[J]. 辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2005, 33(3): 125-129 |
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| 作者姓名： | 郑宏星 |
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| 作者单位： | 沈阳师范大学,国际商学院,辽宁,沈阳,110034 |
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| 摘 要： | 契约的实施性影响企业组织形式的选择,对违约行为与契约实施机制的分析有助于理解企业在一体化与长期契约之间的选择。本文对我国的违约行为与契约的实施机制的特殊性进行了分析,将不可实施的契约分为自然违约、“敲竹杠”(hold-up problem)与恶意违约三种类型;在此基础上,笔者以东软集团有限公司为例,指出在恶意违约大量存在、信誉机制缺乏与法律执行力弱的情况下,一体化而不是长期契约是中国企业组织形式的理性选择。
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| 关 键 词： | 不完全契约 敲竹杠 恶意违约 信誉 一体化 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-3291(2005)03-0125-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-09-21 |
Contract Enforcement and the Organizational Selection of Firm in China |
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| ZHENG Hong-xing. Contract Enforcement and the Organizational Selection of Firm in China[J]. Jounal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2005, 33(3): 125-129 |
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| Authors: | ZHENG Hong-xing |
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| Abstract: | The choice of the organizational form offirms is influenced by the enforcement of contracts. In the paper the author analyzes the enforcement mechanism of contracts in China. Unenforceable contracts are divided into three types: natural unenforceable contracts, hold up problem related unenforceable contracts and hostile unenforceable contracts. Taking the NEUSOFT Group for example, the author's point of view is that integration rather than long-term contracts is the rational selection of firm when hostile unenforceable contracts are common, reputation mechanism is lacked, and the enforcement of law is weak. |
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| Keywords: | imperfect contracts hold-up problem hostile unenforceable contracts reputation |
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