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Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments,matchings and pairings
Authors:G. Bordes  M. Le Breton
Affiliation:(1) L.A.R.E., Faculté des Sciences économiques et de Gestion, Université de Bordeaux 1, Avenue Léon Duguit, F-33604 Pessac Cédex, France;(2) L.E.M.E., Faculté des Sciences économiques et de Gestion, Université de Rennes 1, 7 place Hoche, F-35000 Rennes, France
Abstract:In this paper, we show that Arrow's and Wilson's theorems hold for permutation, symmetric permutation and symmetric domains. Permutation domains concern assignments: n indivisible private goods are distributed betweenn selfish individuals. Symmetric permutation domains concern matchings: two sets ofn selfish individuals being given, pairs with an individual from each set are to be made. Symmetric domains concern pairings: a set of 2n selfish individuals being given,n pairs of individuals are to be made.We thank two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions.
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