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略论近代公司少数股东的自我保护机制
引用本文:高新伟,高丹. 略论近代公司少数股东的自我保护机制[J]. 兰州学刊, 2006, 0(4): 38-40
作者姓名:高新伟  高丹
作者单位:中国人民大学,清史研究所,北京,100872;武汉科技大学,文法与经济学院,湖北,武汉,430081
摘    要:公司制度于近代移植到中国后,少数股东的保护问题随之产生。为了吸引广大中小股东投资,近代公司不断完善对少数股东的保护规定。其中由少数股东直接参与公司的监督与治理,实现中小股东的自我保护,是公司治理的基本制度安排。但是,实际执行效果并不理想,由少数股东直接参与监督、治理,并非有效途径。

关 键 词:少数股东  保护机制  剩余索取权  剩余控制权
文章编号:1005-3492(2006)04-0038-03
修稿时间:2005-11-20

The Monitoring Mechanism of Minority Shareholder in Contemporary Company
Gao Xinwei,Gao Dan. The Monitoring Mechanism of Minority Shareholder in Contemporary Company[J]. , 2006, 0(4): 38-40
Authors:Gao Xinwei  Gao Dan
Affiliation:Gao Xinwei Gao Dan
Abstract:the problem of protecting minority shareholder came into being as well as the introducing of company system.Regulations to safeguard minority shareholder were continually consummate through the way of authorization minority shareholder to prevent from holding-shareholder.As a basic principle,the minority shareholder should directly participate in monitoring the company so as to stick up for their rights and interests.However,facts showed this was not an efficiency way that they had to fall back to informality system,which showed that this was not a available way for minority shareholder to participate in supervise directly.
Keywords:minority Shareholder  claim to residue  residual rights of control  protecting mechanism  
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