| 不完全契约、非对称信息与合作社经营者激励——农民专业合作社“委托—代理”理论模型的构建及其应用 |
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| 引用本文： | 谭智心,孔祥智.不完全契约、非对称信息与合作社经营者激励——农民专业合作社“委托—代理”理论模型的构建及其应用[J].中国人民大学学报,2011(5). |
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| 作者姓名： | 谭智心 孔祥智 |
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| 作者单位： | 农业部农村经济研究中心;中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金重大招标项目“发展农民专业合作组织和完善农村基本经营制度研究”(08&ZD021) |
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| 摘 要： | 我国农民专业合作社内部的委托—代理关系有其自身的特点,通过对符合我国农民专业合作社运行实践的委托—代理理论模型的构建及理论分析可知,合作社代理人努力行为的激励与其自身经营农产品占合作社经营农产品总量的比重、对互惠关注的敏感性程度和占有合作社盈余分配的比例等因素存在正相关关系。合作社内部产生委托—代理问题的根源在于合作社内部的不完全契约和非对称信息,为避免合作社经营者可能采取的隐藏信息和隐藏行动的机会主义行为,建议从信号传递和信号甄别的角度对合作社内部的相关契约加以改进。
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| 关 键 词： | 不完全契约 非对称信息 激励 “委托—代理”模型 |
Incomplete Contract,Asymmetric Information and Incentive to Cooperative Operators:Construction and Application of Principal-Agent Model of Farmer Cooperatives |
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| TAN Zhi-xin,KONG Xiang-zhi.Incomplete Contract,Asymmetric Information and Incentive to Cooperative Operators:Construction and Application of Principal-Agent Model of Farmer Cooperatives[J].Journal of Renmin University of China,2011(5). |
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| Authors: | TAN Zhi-xin KONG Xiang-zhi |
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| Institution: | TAN Zhi-xin1,KONG Xiang-zhi2(1.Research Center of Rural Economy,Ministry of Agriculture,Beijing 100810,2.School of Agriculture and Rural Development,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872) |
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| Abstract: | The principal-agent relationship of farmer cooperatives in China has its own characteristics.By building theoretical models and analysis for the principal-agent relationship we know that the incentive for agents to operate cooperatives has positive correlation with the proportion of their own products to the total,the sensitivity of mutual concern and the share of the distribution of surplus.The principal-agent problem of farmer cooperatives roots in the incomplete contracts and asymmetric information.To av... |
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| Keywords: | incomplete contract asymmetric information incentives principal-agent model |
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