中国省级政府间财政竞争效应的识别与解析:1978～2006年

采用工具变量法(2SLS)对1978～2006年分省面板数据的实证分析显示,我国省级政府间存在显著的财政策略性行为,且策略性反应函数向右上方倾斜。同时,东中西部省份之间财政策略性反应特征不同,呈现出跨区差异与俱乐部效应。税收竞争与标尺竞争作为财政策略性行为两种表现形式具有不同的政策内涵,故本文又通过提出相应的可检验命题,对我国省际财政策略性行为的具体表现形式进行了识别。实证结果显示我国省级政府间争夺流动性税基的税收竞争效应显著,而理论上的"自上而下的标尺竞争"效应没有得到证实。这意味着对中央政府而言,为了避免税收竞争可能产生的"race to the bottom"低水平均衡,"做对协调"比"做对激励"更重要。

The Identification and Analysis of the Effect of the Financial Competition between China's Provincial Governments between 1978 and 2006

Using IV (2SLS) regression, we have made a case study on the panel data of China's provincial governments from 1978 to 2006, which demonstrates that there exists remarkable tactful financial behavior among China's provincial governments and that the tactful interaction function inclines to upward to the right. Different are the characteristics of the financial tactful interaction in the east, middle and west part of China, showing the cross-region effect and club effect. As two manifestations of financial t...