Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power |
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| Authors: | Thomas Gehrig, Werner Gü th, Vittoria Levati, Rene Levinsky, Axel Ockenfels, Tobias Uske,Torsten Weiland |
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| Affiliation: | aInstitute of Research in Economic Evolution, University of Freiburg, Germany;bMax Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Str. 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany;cDipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università degli Studi di Bari, Italy;dUniversity of Cologne, Department of Economics, Köln, Germany |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders. We also elicit responders’ willingness to pay for (un)conditional veto power. The bids reveal a large endowment effect. |
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| Keywords: | Ultimatum Dictator Fairness Veto power Endowment effect |
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