首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

政策促进、金融支农与农村“三权”抵押
引用本文:曹跃群,向 红.政策促进、金融支农与农村“三权”抵押[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2012,11(3):40-47.
作者姓名:曹跃群  向 红
作者单位:重庆大学公共管理学院
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目(08XJY031);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJXS10011126)
摘    要:采用演化博弈方法对农村"三权"抵押融资中地方政府与金融机构的合作机制进行建模,探索了政府的激励政策与约束政策对金融机构积极支农的影响效应,并进行了数值模拟。研究发现:政府的激励与约束政策是影响金融机构支农和政府公共目标实现的决定因素。在实现政府公共目标的初期,约束政策较激励政策更有效;随着政府公共目标的逐步实现,激励政策将发挥更大效用。

关 键 词:政策促进  金融支农  农村“三权”  演化博弈
收稿时间:4/5/2012 12:00:00 AM

Policies and Financial Support to Rural Area and Rural "Three Rights" Mortgage Financing
CAO Yue-qun,XIANG Hong.Policies and Financial Support to Rural Area and Rural "Three Rights" Mortgage Financing[J].Journal of South China Agricultural University:Social Science Edition,2012,11(3):40-47.
Authors:CAO Yue-qun  XIANG Hong
Institution:(School of Public Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)
Abstract:This paper analyzes the government policies and the agriculture-assistance behavior of rural financial institutions based on evolutionary game theory.It explores the effect of government’s incentive policies and constraint policies on the financial institutions’ enthusiasm to support farmers,and makes a numerical simulation.Study finds that: government’s incentive and constraint policies are the decisive factors affecting agriculture-assistance and the government’s public target.The constraint policies are more effective than the incentive ones during the initial stage of government targets.The incentive policies play more important role in later stages of government targets.Finally’ the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on the rural financial institutions.
Keywords:policies to promote  financial support to rural Area  rural"Three rights"  evolutionary Game
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《华南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《华南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号