Reliant behavior in the United States and Japan |
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| Authors: | TR Beard RO Beil Jnr Y Mataga |
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| Institution: | Auburn University, 415 W Magnolia Rm 203, Department of Economics, Auburn, AL 36849-5242, USA Fax: 1 334 844 4615 Phone: 1 334 844 2921 E-mail:;Auburn University, 415 W Magnolia Rm 203, Department of Economics, Auburn, AL 36849-5242, USA Fax: 1 334 844 4615 Phone: 1 334 844 2921 E-mail:;University of Marketing and Distribution Sciences, 3-chome Gakuen-Nishi-machi, Nishiku Kobe, 651-21, Japan Phone: 81 78 796 3543 Fax: 81 78 794 6149 E-mail: |
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| Abstract: | Japanese economic success is often attributed to culturally reinforced psychological conditioning that promotes interpersonal reliance, cooperation, and a group interest orientation. This article provides direct experimental evidence on differences in behavior among future business people in the United States and Japan. Utilizing a simple, two person extensive form game of perfect information introduced by Selten (1975), we provide evidence that, contrary to some views, the Japanese can be less reliant on the behavior of others and are more likely to take actions at variance with group welfare in some settings. Thus, popular explanations of Japanese economic achievements may require further exploration. |
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