基于期权契约的政企联合储备应急物资模型与利润分配机制研究

突发灾害发生后,应急物资需求量呈现爆发式增长。在实际情况下,为了保障应急物资的及时性与可用性,政府可能与不止一家供应商联合储备应急物资。目前众多研究均假设在应急物资供应链中,只存在一个应急物资供应商,鲜有关于政府与多个供应商联合储备应急物资的研究,也缺少对竞争型供应商利润分配机制的探讨。当然,与政府达成储备合作协议的企业也不宜过多,否则会增加政府对供应商利润分配的难度及潜在的管理成本。因此,本研究以政府与两个竞争型供应商联合储备应急物资的情形为例,构建了基于期权契约的政府与两个供应商联合储备应急物资模型,推导出政企最优决策策略。当供应链达到协调时,与政府单独储备模型相比,政企联合储备应急物资模型降低了政府常规物资储备水平,提高了应急物资储备总量。在此基础上,本文还给出了政府成本与两个供应商利润都得到改善的条件,确定了合理分配供应商利润的期权执行价格取值范围。本研究更加贴近我国国情与应急物资储备的实际情况及现实条件,对强化政企合作储备应急物资具有重要的意义,为政府更好地应对突发灾情提供了操作策略与指导原则。

The Model of Joint Relief Supplies Pre-positioning by the Governmentand Two Suppliers Based on Option Contractsand Suppliers' Profits Allocation Mechanism

The recent emergencies or natural disasters occurred across all corners of the whole world, such earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, etc. Sudden disasters not only increase the demand of relief supplies, but also pose a serious security threat to people's health and life as well as property. The demand of relief supplies after a sudden disaster occurs will be an explosive growth. In real situations, in order to effectively guarantee the timeliness and availability of relief supplies, the government may urgently purchase relief supplies from multiple suppliers. However, the overwhelming majority of the existing studies assume that there only exists a single supplier in the relief supply chain, and few studies have been conducted with respect to the relief supply chain that consists of a single government and multiple suppliers. The number of agreement enterprises cooperated with the government, of course, should not be too many. Otherwise, it will increase the government's management cost and add difficulties tocoordinate each supplier's profit allocation.Therefore, the situation of joint relief supplies pre-positioning by the government and two suppliers is taken as an example, and the model of joint relief supplies pre-positioning is constructed. Considering relief supplies system as a relief supply chain, option contracts are introduced into the relief chain management. At the first stage, the government purchases a certain amount of real relief supplies and options from every supplier, which can be executed by the government at an execution price. At the second stage, the government decides how many relief supplies to purchase from suppliers 1 and 2 after the actual demand of relief supplies is realized. With some reasonable assumptions, the model of joint relief supplies pre-positioning by the government and two suppliers via option contracts is established.Next, the following critical questions are intended to be addressed. First, should the government select the government single pre-positioning model or the model of joint relief supplies pre-positioningby the government and two suppliers? Second, it is more profitable for the government to adapt the model of joint relief supplies pre-positioning, what are optimal pre-positioning strategies of the government and suppliers? Third, under what conditions will the government and suppliers will be better off? Finally, under which suppliers' profits allocation mechanism will the government make each supplier willing to conduct contracts?After derivation, there are several key findings associated with our study. First, it is found that the relief supply chain with the government and two suppliers can be coordinated via option contracts. Under cannel coordination, the model of joint relief supplies pre-positioning is superior to the government single pre-positioning model because it improves the total joint amount of relief supplies, as well as reduce the government's regular inventory level. Second, the conditions are presented which help the government and the suppliers achieve an all-win situation. Third, there exists a suppliers' profits allocation mechanism which makes each supplier willing to conduct contracts.At last, all conclusions are validated by a numerical example. Our findings contribute to provide managerial insights for the government's decisions of relief supplies pre-positioning.