政府监管与企业加入第三方国际环境审计的模糊博弈分析

针对政府环境监管与企业实施环境行为博弈分析中无法对双方的损益情况做出判断的问题,文章结合三角模糊数构建了政府监管和企业加入第三方国际环境审计的博弈模型,分别指出了纯策略纳什均衡和混合策略均衡情况需要满足的条件,讨论了政府与污染环境企业博弈策略的影响因素及作用机制,为政府监管与企业加入第三方国际环境审计顺利实施提供了相关建议。然后通过三角结构元方法对算例进行求解,验证了结论的正确性和可行性,引入三角模糊概念更加符合实际应用情况,拓展了第三方国际环境审计的应用背景。研究结果表明,政府对消费者消费的引导和对污染企业的惩罚对企业是否决定加入第三方国际环境审计起着举足轻重的作用。

Fuzzy Game Analysis of Government Participation in Supervision Behavior and the Third Party International Environmental Audit of Enterprise

Based on triangular fuzzy number, the game model is constructed to solve the problem of can not making accurate judements on both government supervision and enterprises taking part in the third party international environmental audit payoffs in game analysis. The payoffs are expressed with triangular fuzzy numbers,which are better to be described with inaccurate information. The influencing factors and the mechanism of the game strategy are discussed between the government and the polluting enterprises.The conditions of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium and the mixed strategy equilibrium are pointed out and some advice is given for the implementation of game mode. Then, a numerical example is given to verify the correctness and feasibility of the conclusion by the means of structural element method, introducing the concept of the triangular fuzzy number facilitates suiting the applications and extending the application background of the third party international environmental audit. The results show that the government's guidance to consumer consumption and the punishment to polluting enterprises play an important role in deciding whether to join the third party international environmental audit for enterprises.