零售商的资金约束对协调契约的影响分析

在零售商促销下，探讨了零售商的资金约束对使用收益共享契约和回购契约协调供应链的影响。分析了零售商拥有不同运营资金下供应链的契约协调问题，研究表明：在运营资金相对充裕下，收益共享契约不仅能协调供应链，且能实现渠道收益的任意分配，但回购契约不能实现渠道收益的任意分配，除非运营资金非常充裕；在运营资金不足下，收益共享契约仍有可能协调供应链，但回购契约不能协调供应链。讨论了资金的时间价值对两个契约协调供应链的影响，结果表明：在回购契约下，资金利率越大，具有资金约束零售商的供应链被协调的可能性越大，但资金利率对收益共享契约没有影响。最后提供了数值分析。研究中得到一些管理启示，可为资金约束供应链的协调管理提供理论借鉴。

Impact of Financial Constraint of a Retailer on Supply Chain Coordination

Due to limited capital, single business and operational risk, the great majority of small-and-medium-sized retailing firms are often faced with shortage of funds. What's more, it is difficult to solve shortage of operational capital through external financing owning to be incapable of providing sufficient collateral. In the absence of financing opportunities, operating decisions of the retailers will inevitably be subject to their own operating funds, and this in turn results to exert an important impact on supply chain coordination. To discuss impact of shortage of operational capital on coordination of the supply chain, in this paper a model is constructed on contract coordination of a supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer, where the retailer's funds are used in two ways:one is the procurement of goods and the other is promotional activities. In particular, more attention is paid to impact on coordination contracts of the retailer's operating capital and funds rate.Firstly, on the assumption that there doesn't exist financing opportunities for the retailer, it investigates supply chain coordination via revenue sharing contract and buyback contract, respectively. A contract is called as type I coordination contract if it not only can coordinate the supply chain, but also can achieve arbitrary revenue allocation of the entire supply chain, and a contract is called as type II coordination contract if it can coordinate the supply chain, but can't achieve arbitrary allocation of the supply chain revenue. According to the retailer's operating funds, revenue sharing contract is divided into either type I coordination contract or type II coordination contract, and buyback contract has three different categories:type I coordination contract, type II coordination contract and non-coordination contract.Secondly, it characterizes a critical condition for revenue sharing contract and buyback contract, respectively, which can be used to determine what type of contract belongs to. This condition can be expressed by the retailer's operating funds and the bargaining powers of the channel members. Equivalence of the two contracts is as well discussed, which leads to conclusion as follows. The two contracts are not always equivalent if the retailer is confronted with capital constraint. Put particular words, if the retailer's funds are very abundant, the two contracts are totally equivalent; if the retailer's funds are relatively abundant, the two contracts are partly equivalent; if the retailer's lack of funds, the two contracts are no longer equivalent. The difference that the two contracts coordinate the supply chain with financial constraints lies in:the revenue sharing mechanism possess financing function in nature (the supplier provides financing for the retailer), but the buyback contract does not have this function.Last but not least, it explores impact of financial time value on supply chain coordination in the two contracts, and the results show that it is more likely to make use of buyback contract to succeed in coordination of the supply chain as the funds rate rises. However, the funds rate has no effect on revenue sharing contract. In the case of buyback contract, as the funds rate increases, the wholesale price decreases and the buyback price holds unchanged. In the case of revenue sharing contract, the time value of funds does not exert an effect on the likelihood that the supply chain can be coordinated.From discussion some managerial insight is obtained, which can provide theoretical reference on contract coordination for the supply chains confronted with capital constraint.