考虑参照依赖的企业合作创新演化博弈分析

合作创新具有实现资源互补,降低创新风险,提高创新成功可能性的优势,但是在实践中企业间的合作关系却难以保持稳定性。本文基于有限理性假设,改变传统的期望效用理论,引入前景理论中的参照点概念,分析创新主体的效用,构建合作创新博弈收益感知矩阵,并基于该矩阵对合作创新博弈双方的行为进行演化博弈分析,为保持合作创新的持续性提出建议。研究表明,企业对创新收益的感知价值、合作创新成本、收益分配和成本分担等因素是合作稳定性的重要影响因素,增强企业对长期的战略性合作创新收益的感知,引导企业建立正确的创新风险认知,控制合作创新的交易成本等措施将有利于增强合作创新的稳定性。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperative Innovation Based on Reference Dependence

Cooperative innovation has the advantages of realizing resource complementarily, reducing the risk of innovation and improving the possibility of innovation success, but it is difficult to maintain the stability of cooperation among enterprises in practice. Because the behavior of innovators directly affects the stability of cooperative relationship, the research on the behavior of innovators has always been one of the focuses. However, most of the existing studies are based on the assumption that the innovators are completely rational. Obviously, there is a gap between this assumption and the reality. In view of this problem, based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, the traditional expected utility theory is changed, introduces the reference dependence is introduced to analyze the utility of the innovation subject, and the cooperative innovation revenue matrix. Based on the matrix is constructed, the evolutionary game analysis of the cooperative game is carried out, and the numerical analysis is simulated by MATLAB.The research shows that the factors such as the perceived value of cooperative innovation and independent innovation, the cost of cooperative innovation, the distribution of income are the important factors affecting the stability of cooperation. It is beneficial to enhance the stability of cooperation and innovation by enhancing the perception of long-term strategic cooperation and innovation and guiding enterprises to establish correct innovation risk awareness and controlling the transaction cost of cooperative innovation.The interaction of cooperative innovation subjects in the context of bounded rationality is examined, and corresponding policy recommendations are given to enhance the stability of cooperative innovation on the analysis of game analysis, which is helpful to expand the research of bounded rationality in the field of cooperative innovation.