考虑公众感知价值的突发性抢购事件演化博弈分析

针对当前研究较少考虑到突发性抢购事件中公众的主观感知行为和多方博弈问题的现状,首先运用前景理论刻画了基准情境与抢购情境中公众对物品的感知价值;其次,界定了突发性抢购事件中参与主体(即公众与政府)的作用及其博弈关系,并在考虑到公众的感知价值基础上给出了博弈支付矩阵;然后,构建了抢购事件参与主体间的演化博弈模型,推导了模型的平衡点及其稳定性条件,并结合抢购事件的不同演化阶段对博弈均衡结果进行了分析;最后,以2011年日本核泄漏事故引发的中国抢盐事件为例,分析了博弈关系的演化和验证了理论研究的有效性,并考查了政府的辟谣效果和公众的心理预期价值对公众抢购行为演化的影响。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Sudden Panic Buying Events Considering the Perceived Value of the Public

The sudden panic buying event (PBE) could not only cause social disorder, but also bring huge economic losses. Thus it is of great significance to study the evolution mechanism of PBE to clear its evolution direction and regulation strategies. In view of the fact that the existing studies rarely consider the subjective perception behavior of the public and the problem of multi-player game in sudden panic buying events, the prospect theory is first used to describe the perceived value of the public in the situations of benchmark and panic buying respectively. Secondly, the role of participants (i.e., the public and government) and their game relationships in PBE are defined, and the game payment matrix is given considering the perceived value of the public. Then, an evolutionary game model between the participants is developed, and equilibrium points and their stability conditions of this model are deduced. Further, equilibrium results are analyzed in combination with different evolutionary stages of PBE. Finally, the validity of theoretical studies is verified by taking the salt panic buying in China in the 2011 Japanese nuclear accident as an example. Afterwards the impact of the rumor-refuting effect of governments and the expected value of the public on the evolution of PBE are tested. The results show that the rumor-refuting effect of governments could affect the steady state of PBE and the time it evolves to the steady state. The expected value of the public could not only affect the emergence of PBE and the speed at which it reaches steady states, but also affect the number of people at any time in the process of eliminating PBE. The above results could provide reference for identifying the evolution mechanism and law of PBE and formulating regulation strategies.