| “代建制”模式下激励模型的研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 杜亚灵,尹贻林.“代建制”模式下激励模型的研究[J].西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2008,18(1):51-57. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杜亚灵 尹贻林 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072
2. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072;天津理工大学,管理学院,天津,300384 |
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| 基金项目： | 天津市科委规划研究项目 |
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| 摘 要： | “代建制”是对非经营性政府投资项目实施过程的市场化改革，目前仍处于试行阶段，其存在的不足本质上是因为激励机制不健全，尤其是代建报酬的确定仍然没有完全通过市场机制来实现。本文分析了现行代建报酬确定的方法及其缺陷，根据代建制模式下委托-代理关系特点，对道德风险模型进行了改进，得出了代建制模式下的最优合同条件。
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| 关 键 词： | 代建制 政府投资项目 委托-代理 激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-472X(2008)01-0051-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年9月21日 |
Study on Incentive Model of Construction-Agent System |
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| DU YALING,YIN YILIN.Study on Incentive Model of Construction-Agent System[J].Journal of Xidian University (Social Sciences Edition),2008,18(1):51-57. |
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| Authors: | DU YALING YIN YILIN |
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| Institution: | DU YALING, YIN YILIN (1. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072, China; 2. School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin, 300384, China) |
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| Abstract: | Construction-Agent System is an innovation which makes the nonprofit government investment projects more market-oriented. It is in a probative period now and its deficiencies are due to the unsound incentive mechanism, especially the fact that the agent fee is not fixed on through the market. In this paper, the method for fixing on the agent fee and its defects are analyzed. The moral risk model is improved according to the features of the principal-agent relationship under the construction-agent system, and the condition of optimal contract is presented. |
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| Keywords: | Construction-agent system Government investment projects： Principal-Agent Incentive |
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