Criticality in games with multiple levels of approval |
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Authors: | Sreejith Das |
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Affiliation: | (1) Institute of SocioEconomics, University of Hamburg, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany |
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Abstract: | In this article, criticality within a voting game is rigorously defined and examined. Criticality forms the basis of the traditional voting power measures frequently employed to analyse voting games; therefore understanding criticality is a pre-requisite to understanding any such analysis. The concept of criticality is extended to encompass games in which players are allowed to express multiple levels of approval. This seemingly innocuous extension raises some important questions, forcing us to re-evaluate exactly what it means to be critical. These issues have been largely side-stepped by the main body of research as they focus almost exclusively on ‘yes/no’ voting games, the so called single level approval voting games. The generalisation to multilevel approval voting games is much more than just a theoretical extension, as any single level approval game in which a player can abstain is in effect a multilevel approval voting game. |
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