| 委托问题与国有经济的公司治理 |
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| 引用本文： | 周刚.委托问题与国有经济的公司治理[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2001,3(4):50-54,112. |
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| 作者姓名： | 周刚 |
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| 作者单位： | 清华大学经济管理学院, |
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| 基金项目： | 小林实 (清华大学 )中国经济研究基金资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 委托问题是导致我国竞争性行业的国有企业“内部人控制”的关键。论文从企业所有权理论入手 ,证明和建议建立既有意愿又有能力选择和监督经营者的大股东能有效控制委托问题和内部人控制 ,并对其他相关观点进行了评价 ;论文还对我国非竞争性行业的国有企业在未来充分竞争的市场环境中通过国有民营而取得效率发展提供了思路
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| 关 键 词： | 委托问题 企业所有权 公司治理 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-441(2001)04-0050-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2000年4月6日 |
Commission and reform of state-owned companies |
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| ZHOU Gang.Commission and reform of state-owned companies[J].Journal of Southeast University(Philosophy and Social Science ),2001,3(4):50-54,112. |
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| Authors: | ZHOU Gang |
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| Abstract: | Commissioning is a key factor in leading to the "internal presonnel control" of state owned companies of China's competitive sectors.Based on the theory of enterprise ownership,this paper porves and establishes a mechanism of major shareholders effectively controlling commission and internal personnel through voluntery will and capability to select and supervise managers.Comments are also made on other relevant viewpoints;suggestions are offered for stat owned companies of China's noncompetitive sectors to achieve efficient development by means of public management under state ownership in the future highly competitive market. |
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| Keywords: | commission enterprise ownership reform of companies |
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