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供应链中企业基于产品最终需求的博弈分析
引用本文:赵立力,廖炜,黄庆.供应链中企业基于产品最终需求的博弈分析[J].西南交通大学学报(社会科学版),2005,6(5):33-36.
作者姓名:赵立力  廖炜  黄庆
作者单位:1. 西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川,成都,610031
2. 西南交通大学土木工程学院,四川,成都,610031
摘    要:供应链中零部件供应商在完全信息情况下的价格博弈模型表明:企业产品价格与自身的单位生产成本成正向变动关系,与对方企业的单位生产成本成反向变动关系。而不完全信息情况下的价格博弈模型表明:企业产品价格不但与各自的单位产品生产成本有关,还与下游企业对上游企业的期望单位产品生产成本也有关。

关 键 词:供应链  完全信息  不完全信息  纳什均衡  贝叶斯均衡
文章编号:1009-4474(2005)05-0033-04
修稿时间:2005年5月10日

Analysis of the Game of Suppliers in the Supply Chain Based on the Final Demand of Products
ZHAO Li-li,LIAO Wei,HUANG Qing.Analysis of the Game of Suppliers in the Supply Chain Based on the Final Demand of Products[J].Journal of Southwest Jiaotong Universit(Social Science Edition),2005,6(5):33-36.
Authors:ZHAO Li-li  LIAO Wei  HUANG Qing
Abstract:The model for the price game of spare part suppliers with complete information shows that the price of an enterprise's products has a positive relation to the unit cost of production of this enterprise and a negative relation to the unit cost of production of its trading enterprises.The model for the price game of spare part suppliers with incomplete information shows that the price of an enterprise's price is related not only to the unit cost of production of both this enterprise and its trading enterprise but also to the unit cost of production that the lower-reach enterprise expects of the upper-reach enterprise.
Keywords:supply chain  complete information  incomplete information  Nash equilibrium  Bayesian equilibrium
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