首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

对一个“监察博弈”模型的几点质疑
引用本文:张泓.对一个“监察博弈”模型的几点质疑[J].武汉大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2004,57(1):45-48.
作者姓名:张泓
作者单位:天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072
摘    要:通过对一个"监察博弈"模型从概念、策略得益的取值、期望得益的计算及纳什均衡解的意义等方面进行比较彻底的修正性质疑,指出了"监察博弈"模型在局中人策略的依存性、假定条件的客观验证性、运算分析的逻辑严谨性等三个方面的不足。在此基础上,建立了一个新的监督博弈模型,并通过对模型求解,提出了治理市场经济秩序的三点政策建议。

关 键 词:博弈论  模型  纳什均衡
文章编号:1672-7320(2004)01-0045-04
修稿时间:2003年10月29

Some Suspicions about Supervision Game Model
ZHANG Hong.Some Suspicions about Supervision Game Model[J].Wuhan University Journal (Social Sciences),2004,57(1):45-48.
Authors:ZHANG Hong
Abstract:According to the relatively thorough modificatory suspicion about a "Supervision Game Model" from the concept, the evaluation of strategy profit, and the calculation of expected profit to the significance of Nash Equilibrium Outcome, it is pointed out that three aspects of weaknesses exist in the "Supervision Game", which are the dependence of the strategies of players, the objective validation of assumed conditions, and the logical preciseness of operation analysis. Based on that, a new "Supervision Game Model" is founded, and three politic proposals about the management of market economic order are brought forward with the solution of the model.
Keywords:game theory  model  Nash Equilibrium  
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号