| 多功能开放型企业供需网成员企业合作关系的经济模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 何静 徐福缘. 多功能开放型企业供需网成员企业合作关系的经济模型[J]. 上海理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2005, 27(1): 37-42 |
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| 作者姓名： | 何静 徐福缘 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]上海水产大学经贸学院，上海200090 [2]上海理工大学管理学院，上海200093 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70072020)国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划)资助项目(863-511-941-003) |
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| 摘 要： | 多功能开放型企业供需网(SDN)合作伙伴关系的稳定性，将直接决定SDN创新管理理念的生命力和未来发展前景，传统企业间的一次性静态博弈和供应链(SC)盟员间的有限次重复博弈，都是低效的合作关系，因而其稳定性较差，无限次重复博弈以及由此而引发的触发策略，能够实现帕累托最优的纳什均衡，是SDN合作伙伴关系稳定发展的深层经济学原因，通过建立SDN成员企业合作关系的经济模型，论证了SDN的稳定性。
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| 关 键 词： | 多功能开放型企业供需网 重复博弈 稳定性 |
Economic model of cooperation relationship among members in SDN |
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| HE Jing,XU Fu-yuan. Economic model of cooperation relationship among members in SDN[J]. Journal of University of Shanghai For Science and Technilogy(Social Science), 2005, 27(1): 37-42 |
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| Authors: | HE Jing XU Fu-yuan |
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| Abstract: | The stability of supply and demand network with multi-functional and opening characteristics for enterprises SDN is essential to its vitality and development. The cooperation relationships among enter prises in either one-short static state game in traditional enterprises or finitely repeated games in supply chain are inefficient. Infinitely repeated game and grim strategy that can lead to Pareto dominance Nash equilibrium are the deep economic reasons which explain the stability of SDN. The paper will demonstrate the stability of SDN in detail through building the economic model of cooperation relationship among members in SDN. |
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| Keywords: | SDN repeated game stability |
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