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中国近代公司监事会独立性问题初探
引用本文:高新伟. 中国近代公司监事会独立性问题初探[J]. 兰州学刊, 2008, 0(10): 143-144,157
作者姓名:高新伟
作者单位:河南大学,产业经济与农业发展研究所,河南,开封,475004
摘    要:监事会作为公司专门的监督机关,保持与被监督对象的独立性是其监督有效的前提。尽管近代公司在监事会的独立性方面有所规定,但在实践中效果并不理想。究其原因,除了相关规定不完善、股权集中及监事会与董事会职能重叠以外,最根本的原因还在于公司内部的集权体制。公司的集权性质,决定了近代公司监事会难以保持独立性,这对于今天公司制度的建设,具有积极的借鉴意义。

关 键 词:近代公司  监事会  监察人  独立性

Analysis on Independency of Board of Supervisors in Contemporary Company
Gao Xinwei. Analysis on Independency of Board of Supervisors in Contemporary Company[J]. , 2008, 0(10): 143-144,157
Authors:Gao Xinwei
Abstract:Board of Supervisors,as special monitoring organ,should maintain independence so as to line of duty.However,the effect of Board of Supervisors was bad in independence though there were some regulations in contemporary company.There were causations such as that of faultiness on correlation regulations,of concentrating of stock ownership,and of function overlap which lead to the non-independence of Board of Supervisors.But the essential cause was the centralization of state power system of company.
Keywords:contemporary company  board of supervisors  watchdog  independency  
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