企业信息披露的博弈分析

企业经营管理责任中财产经营者在向财产所有者履行经营责任的信息披露过程中,审计人员总是希望获得更为详细、可靠的企业信息,然而实际操作中只能获得企业的部分信息。如何利用有限的审计资源了解企业全面真实的信息?本文通过建立简单的博弈模型,探讨和分析了审计人员与经营者对企业信息不完全披露的博弈关系,即用多大的审计覆盖率才能达到最佳的审计监督效果的问题。

Game theory analysis of information in company

Transferring management information to owners of enterprises is the responsibility of the operators. During financial auditing, auditors usually want to obtain sufficient and reliable financial information, while in fact they can only get a part of it in their auditing procedures. So the problem is how to utilize limited audit resources to get a meaningful understanding of the true value of the enterprise. In this paper, by building simple Game Theory models, we will try to discuss and analyze the audit coverage ratio in an environment of incomplete information disclosure, namely, to what extent the audit coverage ratio should be for auditors to achieve an optimum audit purpose.